



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

instinctive activities arising upon the appearance of definite objects." The sixth chapter applies the author's theories to what he calls "algedonic æsthetics." Mr. Marshall is aware that "the evidence presented is not crucial," but he is satisfied that "in pushing the theory to its conclusions serious oppositions have not been developed." Nor is it probable that any opposition ever will develop to Mr. Marshall's theories, but we doubt their helpfulness and practical use in the domains of science and art, to the reconciliation of which the work is laudably dedicated. κ.

EMPFINDUNG UND BEWUSSTSEIN. Monistische Bedenken von B. Carneri. Bonn : Emil Strauss. 1893.

It is Mr. Carneri's purpose in this pamphlet to present to the philosophical world the objections which have arisen in his mind affecting the purity of the modern monistic view of the world. Monism, he claims, is scientifically established; the only problem left is *what kind* of monism must be accepted. Mr. Carneri's "objections" are chiefly levelled against the doctrines which claim that mind is simply a side or aspect of matter, and not a function of it; these doctrines logically imply, he thinks, the existence of a nervous system or organisation in all matter, and also a complete unity of nervous and conscious activity, which is absurd. Mind is not, however, an achievement of matter *per se*, but of matter as a *human organism*.

His position apparently implies (1) materialism and (2) agnosticism. But the first is refuted by the fact that in the idealistic view all matter is a simple notion of the mind; and with respect to the second (we quote from a private letter on this subject from the author to the editor of *The Monist*), Mr. Carneri says he will not accept the appellation of "Agnostic," unless he is forced to do so. He does not regard himself as one. He has a very exalted conception of knowledge, which to him is paramount to all, and he says with Kant that it is absolutely incalculable how far man can still penetrate into the secrets of nature. What Mr. Carneri, with Kant, does not regard as belonging in the sphere of human knowledge, because surpassing experience, is the "thing-in-itself" in all its protean aspects. True, he does not use the term "thing-in-itself," and regards it as unfortunate that Kant brought the term into circulation, because it can be, and is, very easily understood, for example by Schopenhauer, as something which has a peculiar essence of its own. Mr. Carneri admits that if he used the expression in this sense one would have every reason for charging him with dualism. But Kant did not understand the expression in this sense, and even characterised this idea of it as a bugbear of the intellect. Things, Mr. Carneri maintains, are simply complexes of sensations. What he calls the "in-itself-existence" of things is that which the things would be if we conceived them severed from our sensations. But of what this is we can acquire no knowledge since it transcends all possible experience, in so far as our experience and with it our knowledge in the last instance leads us back to our sense-activity as to *our own* sensation. With Kant, Mr. Carneri invests things with materiality as a fundamental attribute, while he also classes himself (his feeling) among things. He

ascribes to matter those qualities which all things have in common and which he feels they have. He must assume matter, since otherwise all things, including himself, would be naught, or at best mere ideas, such as Berkeley constructed. What he knows of matter, he knows only through his sensation, and for that very reason he cannot know what matter in itself can be, that is, matter severed from sensation. If this is a subject of knowledge—which he cannot grant, then, and then only, is he an agnostic.

With respect to the religious outcome of his doctrines, we may say that though Mr. Carneri recognises the Religion of Science as a product of perfect correctness of thought, and as the only religion that does not conflict with the present state of our knowledge, yet he thinks that for that very reason the religious element in it is a so exalted one that the religious minds who are satisfied with it must be in the highest sense of the word *élite* human beings. Mr. Carneri admits the statement that man consists of his ideas, his influences, and his aspirations. It depends, therefore, upon the *idea of immortality* which one possesses whether one can be satisfied with the idea of immortality of this religion. Personally, Mr. Carneri has no need of religion or immortality whatsoever, and is so reconciled to the belief that his personality will wholly cease with death that it is to him a blissful certainty. It is a source of real delight to him, he says, and an encouragement to good deeds, to be able to think that some of his achievements will continue after his death to have a beneficent influence on others, in no matter how insignificant a way. But his personality, which will then no longer exist, will have as little share of these as he should have, in his present life, of freedom or property, if he should be robbed of these and others should enjoy them in his place.

These remarks will indicate the general drift of Mr. Carneri's doctrines. *μ.*

INTRODUCTION A LA PSYCHOLOGIE EXPÉRIMENTALE. By *Alfred Bine*. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1894. Pp., 146. Price, fr. 2.50.

There has long been a lack in English of a practical treatise of experimental psychology, and although we notice that two are in preparation—one from the pen of Professor Cattell,—the student, until the appearance of these, may be referred to the present easily-read French work of M. Binet as the best accessible manual of the subject. The volume is a collaboration in a certain measure, parts of it having been written by M. Phillippe, M. Courtier, and M. Victor Henri. Its descriptions refer chiefly to the psychological laboratory of Paris, which is attached to the *École des Hautes-Études*, and to the psychological laboratories of Germany. M. Binet does not profess to know much about the organisation of the numerous laboratories of America, but his ignorance does not diminish the worth of his instructions, as the methods of this study must be essentially the same in all parts of the world. M. Binet mentions the existence of psychological laboratories at two American cities, Medissona and Chompen,* of which we have never heard. Chapter

* Probably Madison, Wis., and Champaign, Ill.